Mergers & Accusations: Chinese Auditing and Corporate Disclosure Standards Indirectly on Trial in the United States by McCarty, Janelle A.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Journal of International Law
2012
Mergers & Accusations: Chinese Auditing and
Corporate Disclosure Standards Indirectly on Trial
in the United States
Janelle A. McCarty
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjil
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota
Journal of International Law collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
McCarty, Janelle A., "Mergers & Accusations: Chinese Auditing and Corporate Disclosure Standards Indirectly on Trial in the United
States" (2012). Minnesota Journal of International Law. 295.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjil/295
 347 
Note 
 
Mergers & Accusations: Chinese Auditing 
and Corporate Disclosure Standards 
Indirectly on Trial in the United States 
Janelle A. McCarty* 
 
In 2011, U.S. courts experienced a sudden rise in class 
action litigation from shareholders of U.S.–listed Chinese 
companies, primarily claiming violations of disclosure duties 
emanating from false information regarding finances and 
operations in China.1 These Chinese companies entered the 
U.S. market through a reverse merger, a transaction where a 
primary company merges with a listed U.S. shell company.2 
This is a relatively inexpensive and fast method of entering the 
U.S. public markets. Chinese companies are not the only 
companies that utilize this transaction to enter the public 
market, but they are the only group that has shareholders 
turning to the courts with claims of fraud, consistently in the 
reverse merger context.3
 
*J.D. Candidate 2013, University of Minnesota Law School, Concentration in 
Business Law; B.S. 2008, University of Nevada-Reno. The author thanks the 
editors and staff of the MJIL for their dedication and assistance improving 
this article. She also thanks her husband, Dr. Matthew M. McCarty, for his 
support and comments on numerous drafts. 
 These Chinese reverse mergers 
(“CRMs”) accounted for 25.5% of all class action filings in the 
 1. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS 
2011 MID-YEAR ASSESSMENT 1, 13 (2011). 
 2. See generally Gariel Nahoum, Small Cap Companies and the Diamond 
in the Rough Theory: Dispelling the IPO Myth and Following the Regulation A 
and Reverse Merger Examples, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1865, 1902–09 (2007) 
(describing the reverse merger transaction). 
 3.  Compare Helen Luk, Sneaking In Through the Back Door, THE HONG 
KONG INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS (May 14, 2011), 
http://app1.hkicpa.org.hk/APLUS/1105/pdf/mergers.pdf, with Henning 
Mennenoeh, Peter Kohl & Wolfgang Kircher, Reverse Mergers Between 
German and US Biotech Companies, 8 BIO-SCIENCE L. REV. 131, 131 (2006) 
(discussing the use of reverse mergers by German biotech companies without 
any mention of fraud). 
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first six months of 2011,4 and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) has since issued an investor warning 
bulletin advising people against investing in these companies.5
U.S.–listed Chinese companies bring with them financial 
information for disclosure from operations in China, raising an 
array of accounting and auditing difficulties for auditors in the 
United States, and often fraudulent information is able to pass 
undetected. Shareholders need to be able to rely on accurate 
corporate disclosures in order to make decisions based on the 
actual market price of publicly traded shares.
 
6 If shareholders 
are not able to rely on that information, the foundation of the 
U.S. securities market is harmed. Currently the only solution 
available for injured shareholders is litigation: a very 
constrained ex post solution that is not likely to result in 
suitable remedies for shareholders.7 Given the rise in CRM 
transactions8
In order to maintain the integrity of the U.S. securities 
market there needs to be an ex ante solution and infrastructure 
in place to properly review the information provided by the 
Chinese company upon merger with a U.S. shell. Such a 
solution will involve cooperation between the Chinese and 
American executive or judicial systems. 
 and the continuing economic relationship 
between China and the United States it seems likely that there 
will continue to be an increase in CRMs involving shell 
companies. Therefore, preventative action needs to be created 
to address this type of fraud before it enters the market. 
No concrete recommendations for an ex ante solution have 
been suggested. While reverse mergers are not treated the 
same as classical mergers when it comes to competition law, a 
bilateral agreement between China and the United States 
could utilize China’s recent competition laws as a foundation 
 
 4. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 1, at 1. 
 5.  See SEC Off. of Investor Educ. & Advoc., Investor Bulletin: Reverse 
Mergers 4 (2011), http://www.investor.gov/sites/default/files/Reverse-
Mergers.pdf. 
 6. See Christian J. Meier-Schatz, Objectives of Financial Disclosure 
Regulation, 8 J. COMP. BUS. & CAP. MARKET L. 219 (1986) (stating that the 
traditional purposes of financial corporate disclosure are investor protection, 
market efficiency and corporate governance, with other broad public policy 
considerations). 
 7. See, e.g., Luk, supra note 3, at 18. 
 8. See Research Note, PCAOB, Activity Summary and Audit 
Implications for Reverse Mergers Involving Companies from the China 
Region: June 1, 2007 to March 31, 2010, 2 (Mar. 14, 2011), 
http://pcaobus.org/Research/Documents/Chinese_Reverse_Merger_Research_N
ote.pdf. 
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for further regulation. China’s competition laws currently 
contain regulations involving a thorough review of merging 
companies.9 Yet while competition laws in the United States 
and China converge, accounting and audit regimes between the 
two countries remain divergent in practice.10
Part I of this note will introduce the reverse merger 
transaction, discuss how it has been problematic for the SEC 
and the China Securities Regulatory Commission (“CSRC”) to 
regulate, and examine the use of international agreements as a 
vehicle for a solution to the fundamental auditing problem in 
CRM transactions. Part II will analyze why the SEC and the 
CSRC are unable to sufficiently administer a solution to the 
CRM problem, as well as why international investment treaties 
are not likely to succeed. Part III will recommend that the 
World Trade Organization (“WTO”) enact an international 
competition law, followed by a bilateral agreement between 
China and the United States directly targeting the root of the 
problem: Chinese auditing and corporate disclosure standards. 
 A bilateral 
agreement should be written to establish procedures necessary 
to ensure accurate information is conveyed to the U.S. market. 
While this solution combines different areas of law, and plays 
with novel concepts mixed with commonly considered 
international legal improvements, it raises interesting methods 
of solving a problem that is currently without adequate remedy.  
I. CRMS, FRAUD, AND THE ROLE OF  
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Reverse mergers are a useful tool for firms wishing to enter 
the public market; however, increasingly these transactions are 
looked at with suspicion based on fraudulent accounting 
concerns. The SEC has tried, unsuccessfully, to combat this,11 
leaving shareholders in the United States with few options. 
These transactions oftentimes escape review in China as well.12 
Even when audited, these transactions remain suspect based 
on the quality and poor enforcement of the regulations 
currently in force in China.13
 
 9. See OWEN NEE & JINGZHOU TAO, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS: 
BUSINESS LAWS OF CHINA 90–91 (2010). 
 Domestic initiatives alone seem 
 10.  See, e.g., Research Note, supra note 8 at 6–8 (reporting that there has 
been 159 CRMs from January 1, 2007 to March 31, 2010 with capitalization of 
$12.8B). 
 11.  See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 1, at 1. 
 12.  See Jay Zhe Zhang, Securities Markets and Securities Regulation in 
China, 22 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 557, 560 (1996–1997). 
 13. See id. at 561–63. 
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insufficient, thus international forums and the use of 
international agreements are examined, specifically in the area 
of competition law, as this may be the best place to turn for a 
solution. 
A. CRM INTERACTION WITH THE U.S. MARKET 
Chinese private firms looking to go public have global 
market options, including mainland markets, Hong Kong, and 
Europe,14 but many choose to enter U.S. equity markets due to 
the size and stability of these markets.15
There are two options for companies seeking to enter U.S. 
public markets: an initial public offering (“IPO”) or a reverse 
merger.
 
16 An IPO is a very time consuming and costly process.17 
IPOs have decreased as investors are reluctant to purchase IPO 
stock, and companies are deterred by the high cost of not only 
entering the market but also paying ongoing regulatory 
compliance costs.18 A reverse merger, on the other hand, is a 
cheaper and faster method of entering the public market 
through the back door.19 A reverse merger, also known as a 
reverse takeover, is not an illegal transaction nor is it 
inherently problematic.20 The transaction involves the 
shareholders of a privately held company acquiring a shell 
company already listed on a public exchange through the 
purchase of a majority of the publicly traded shares.21 In most 
cases, the shell company had previously liquidated its assets 
and had no real value other than outstanding securities.22
 
 14. See Erica Fung, Regulatory Competition in International Capital 
Markets: Evidence From China in 2004-2005, 3 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 243, 250–
52 (2006) (explaining that Chinese domestic markets are not very desirable 
because market forces cannot operate freely in China as the legal framework 
preserves an inefficient top-down management structure). 
 The 
shell shareholders’ share values become determined by the 
 15. See 11A SIMON M. LORNE, ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS § 3:11.10 
(2011) (stating that companies can raise a lot of money in the United States 
partly because of the reliable and stable market system and also noting that 
many Chinese companies are specifically attracted to the NASDAQ because of 
its valuations of internet and technology companies). 
 16. See Leslie A. Gordon, Red-Flagging China: Regulators Eye Chinese 
Companies Using Reverse Mergers to Enter US, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2011, at 17. 
 17. See Luk, supra note 3. 
 18. See Dale A. Oesterle, The High Cost of IPOs Depresses Venture Capital 
in the United States, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 369, 370 (2007). 
 19. See Luk, supra note 3. 
 20. See LORNE, supra note 15, § 8:11.50; Gordon, supra note 16, at 18. 
 21. See LORNE, supra note 15. 
 22. See Aden R. Pavkov, Ghouls and Godsends? A Critique of “Reverse 
Merger” Policy, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 475, 478 (2006). 
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private entity’s activities.23 The merged private company, in 
effect, is therefore already registered with the SEC, bypassing 
the need for the private company to go public yet providing the 
company access to equity markets.24 In essence, the private 
company becomes the SEC reporting entity with access to U.S. 
capital markets, and must file audited financial statements 
with the SEC as well as have an audit performed by a 
registered accounting firm.25 This results in substantially all 
company operations residing in China with securities traded in 
the United States through the shell.26 The merged companies 
are subject to audits and must provide financial statements, 
but there is increased consternation over the significant 
accounting deficiencies that raise concerns of whether some of 
these transactions are vessels for securities fraud.27
A reverse merger offers two advantages over an IPO: it can 
be completed both more quickly and less expensively, allowing 
firms with less capital to gain access to public markets.
 
28 
Reverse mergers are not uncommon in corporate transactions 
in the United States, but the SEC and stock markets are 
suspicious of companies who choose to enter the U.S. public 
market through this route (rather than as an IPO) as there are 
fewer filing requirements and more room for fraudulent 
information to enter the capital markets.29 Potential drawbacks 
in opting for a reverse merger over an IPO are the high costs of 
due diligence in selecting a shell company, problems getting 
free-trading stock, and dealing with other regulatory hurdles.30
 
 23. See id. 
 
Nevertheless, the IPO process is still regarded as more time 
consuming and expensive, making the U.S. market less 
 24. See LORNE, supra note 15, § 3:11.10; see also id. 
 25. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, INVESTIGATIONS AND LITIGATION 
RELATED TO CHINESE REVERSE MERGER COMPANIES 2 (2011). 
 26. See LORNE, supra note 15, § 3:11.10 (explaining that securities fraud 
occurs when the operations of a U.S.–listed Chinese company are almost 
entirely in China, but the U.S. auditors are unable to catch the accounting 
deficiencies or fraud). 
 27. See id. 
 28. See Nahoum, supra note 2, at 1903–04 (establishing that the mean 
duration of a reverse merger is only ninety-two days compared to 287 days for 
an IPO, and the average assets of firms that do a reverse merger are only 
$2.19M as compared to $41.72M for firms that go through an IPO). 
 29. See LORNE, supra note 15, § 3:11.10. 
 30. See Nahoum, supra note 2, at 1904–05 (referencing the argument 
raised by critics of CRM transactions, claiming that the private company has 
to discover if the public shell shares are held by bona fide stockholders or if 
they are controlled by a stock promoter who is simply trying to sell the stock to 
increase the price, which can lead to artificially inflated share prices). 
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attractive than other world markets to Chinese companies:31 
According to the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(“PCAOB”), from 2007 to 2010, only 56 Chinese companies 
entered the U.S. market through IPOs as opposed to 159 
CRMs.32
Reverse mergers can be done with any foreign company, 
but Chinese and German companies predominately utilize the 
transaction within the United States.
 
33 German biotechnology 
firms come to the United States to access liquid markets with a 
well-established regulatory framework due to difficulties 
raising capital in Germany.34 Chinese firms purport to have the 
same aim.35 Unlike an IPO, there is only one requirement for 
firms seeking access to U.S. markets through a reverse 
merger.36 In 2005, the SEC adopted new rules governing 
reverse mergers in an effort to protect investors from fraud.37 
These regulations require the surviving entity to file an 
amended, more detailed Form 8-K within four business days of 
the transaction.38 This disclosure is a comprehensive summary 
of the corporation substantively similar to a Form 10 
registration statement, which is required for the registration of 
securities under Section 12 of the Exchange Act.39 This is an 
enhancement of the previous disclosure requirements on old 
Form 8-K that allowed for a seventy-one day window in which 
to file the Form.40
 
 31. See Fung, supra note 
 The new four-day filing requirement 
14, at 245 (pointing out that Chinese issuers 
who do not want to deal with IPO and SEC burdens in the United States look 
to viable alternatives in Hong Kong and London); see also Paul Gillis, Why 
Audit a U.S. listed Chinese Company?, CHINA ACCT. BLOG (Aug. 31, 2011, 2:38 
PM), http://www.chinaaccountingblog.com/weblog/why-audit-a-us-listed-
chine.html (stating that the average fee for auditing a Chinese company was 
close to $3M for those listed on NYSE and $637,000 for those on the NASDAQ, 
meaning most smaller firms that come to the U.S. market do so through 
reverse mergers). 
 32. See Research Note, supra note 8, at 1. 
 33. See Nahoum, supra note 2, at 1907. 
 34. See Mennenoeh et al., supra note 3, at 131 (discussing the benefits for 
German firms to accessing U.S. markets through reverse mergers). 
 35. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 25, at 1. 
 36. See SEC Off. of Investor Educ. & Advoc., supra note 5, at 1. 
 37. See Use of Form S-8, Form 8-K, and Form 20-F by Shell Companies, 
70 Fed. Reg. 42234 (Jul. 21, 2005) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, 
240, 249). 
 38. See LORNE, supra note 15, § 8:1; see also 17 C.F.R. 249.380 (2011). 
 39. See LORNE, supra note 15, § 8:1. 
 40. Compare SEC, Form 10, http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form10.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 17, 2011), with SEC, Form 8-K, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2011), and 
SEC, Form S-8, http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/forms-8.pdf (last visited Oct. 
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essentially requires that all merger consequences be 
contemplated in advance by the acquiring company.41 The new 
regulations also require audited financial information as part of 
the Form 8-K disclosure.42 Of the 159 CRMs that occurred in 
2007 to 2010, 74% were audited by U.S. accounting firms and 
the remaining 24% by Chinese firms.43
Concerns raised by the SEC and shareholders have come 
from inquiries into the sufficiency of the audits performed by 
U.S. accounting firms of the Chinese companies. The PCAOB, a 
Congressionally-established non-profit auditing organization 
under SEC authority, undertakes to “oversee the audits of 
public companies in order to protect investors and the public 
interest by promoting informative, accurate, and independent 
audit reports.”
 
44 The PCAOB reported that there has been an 
increase in CRMs45 which have almost all of their operations in 
China, but use U.S. accounting firms to perform the required 
audits.46 The PCAOB discovered that many of these accounting 
firms are not performing audits properly due to language 
barriers and a lack of understanding of domestic Chinese 
business practices, among other issues.47 As a result, the 
auditors cannot provide an audit with a reasonable 
understanding of the company’s financial statements.48
 
17, 2011). Form 10 requires information on risk factors, financial information, 
and securities ownership of certain beneficial owners and management, among 
other things. Form S-8 cannot be used for a shell company unless the company 
has transformed from a shell and files a current Form 10. It is insufficient to 
simply provide the SEC with a complete Form S-8. 
 In 
many ways, U.S. auditing firms are at a disadvantage in 
performing due diligence functions. They may lack the 
resources to obtain correct information from the company in 
China; the use of outside consulting firms to interpret the 
language and data without a reasonable basis for relying on 
 41. See also LUSONG ZHANG, REGULATION OF FOREIGN MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS INVOLVING COMPANIES LISTED IN CHINA 173 (2007) (stating 
that the Chinese purchasing company is required to make full disclosure 
concerning its business affairs and financial condition to the seller as part of 
the merger process, as required by the Exchange Act). 
 42. See Research Note, supra note 8, at 6 (acknowledging that auditors 
must be registered with the PCAOB). 
 43. See id. The remaining two percent were Canadian auditing firms. 
 44. See PCAOB, http://pcaobus.org/About/Pages/default.aspx (last visited 
Oct. 17, 2011). 
 45. See Research Note, supra note 8, at 1. 
 46. See id.; see also CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 25. 
 47. See Research Note, supra note 8, at 8; CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, 
supra note 1, at 3. 
 48. See Research Note, supra note 8, at 8. 
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those consultants’ opinions aggravate the perceived regulatory 
weaknesses of this transaction.49
As a result of these auditing difficulties, the SEC reacts 
with hostility towards CRMs because the transactions 
involving shell companies are susceptible to fraud.
  
50 The same 
propensity for fraud51 has yet to be completely addressed even 
with increased regulation by U.S. authorities. As SEC 
Commissioner Luis Aguilar notes, some CRMs are “proving to 
have significant accounting deficiencies or being [used as] 
vessels for outright fraud.”52
B. CLASS ACTION LAWSUITS AGAINST CRMS 
 
Shareholders who have experienced a loss due to false 
disclosures and possible fraud have turned to the U.S. judicial 
system for recovery, but many of the defendant CRM 
companies deny the allegations against them.53 Shareholders 
have brought thirty-three securities class action lawsuits 
alleging various violations, and seven of those CRMs have 
joined investment banks as co-defendants.54 Between January 
1, 2011 and June 30, 2011, CRMs and Chinese mergers and 
acquisitions litigation represented 47.9% of class action filing 
activity, up from 32.7% in the last six months of 2010.55
 
 49. See id. 
 The 
PCAOB has pointed to a lack of proper audits by U.S. auditing 
 50. See LORNE, supra note 15, § 8:1 (noting that the SEC is weary of 
reverse mergers with shell companies because it is common for the post-
reverse merger shell company to fail or become marginally public companies, 
and stock fraud is more common in reverse merger and shell companies than 
in other public companies; the SEC prefers to see companies enter the public 
market through IPOs because it tends to filter out companies that either won’t 
succeed in the public market or firms that have faulty financial statements). 
 51. See Nahoum, supra note 2, at 1905 (referencing reverse merger fraud 
that took place in 1970–80s involving shell companies that had the sole 
purpose of raising money from public investors and removing the money from 
the corporation for their own benefit). 
 52.  Sarah N. Lynch, UPDATE 1 — SEC Probing Fraud at US-Listed 
Foreign Companies, REUTERS (Apr. 4 2011, 3:15 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/04/sec-aguilar-
idUSN0427084520110404; accord CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 25 
(showing the concern that companies provided auditors with fraudulent 
information). 
 53. See David Feldman, China: Boon for Litigators in 2011, REVERSE 
MERGER BLOG (Aug. 26, 2011, 4:08 PM), http://www.reversemergerblog.com. 
 54. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 25, at 3. 
 55. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 1, at 1; see also 
CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS — 2011 MID-
YEAR ASSESSMENT, http://www.cornerstone.com/securities-filings-mid-year-
2011/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2011). 
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firms performed for CRM companies as a possible cause of 
problems.56 Subsequently, the SEC has started to target CRM 
company auditors.57 This reaction could explain why the 
Bloomberg Chinese Reverse Merger Index has reported a 44% 
decrease in the value of CRMs in the first six months of 2011.58
C. CHINESE SECURITIES REGULATION 
 
The CSRC is a relatively new organization and serves a 
similar purpose as the SEC does in the United States. 
Securities regulation in China began in the early 1990s. An 
early attempt, the Regulations Regarding the Issuance and 
Trading of Stock, was enacted to develop China’s socialist 
market economy.59 The fledgling market, however, quickly 
proved to be susceptible to fraud through manipulation and 
falsified records.60 In response, the State Council Securities 
Commission (“SCSC”) was developed to regulate certain types 
of exchanges and was administered by the CSRC.61 The SCSC 
and CSRC merged into the current CSRC, which drafts laws 
and regulations, develops policy, and monitors the securities 
market and related agencies.62 Within the legal framework of 
Chinese securities laws provided through the CSRC, there are 
also “soft rules” that guide activity in securities transactions.63 
These “soft rules” are rules promulgated by the stock exchanges 
themselves, allowing for some form of self-regulation.64 The 
Securities Association of China also contributes to the 
regulatory system by setting industry standards, training 
securities professionals, and mediating disputes between 
members and the CSRC.65
Shareholders are also empowered to enforce regulations. In 
2002, the Supreme People’s Court held that shareholders can 
  
 
 56. See Research Note, supra note 8, at 7–8. 
 57. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 1, at 13. 
 58. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 1, at 13. 
 59. See 2 JAMES M. ZIMMERMAN, CHINA LAW DESKBOOK: A LEGAL GUIDE 
FOR FOREIGN-INVESTED ENTERPRISES 758 (3d ed. 2010). 
 60. See id. at 756. 
 61. See id. at 759. 
 62. See id. 
 63. See Shin-yi Peng, The WTO Legalistic Approach and East Asia: From 
the Legal Culture Perspective, 1 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 13, 11, 19–21 (2000) 
(noting the general Chinese preference for ambiguous and informal dispute 
resolution mechanisms and regulations). 
 64. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 59, at 757 (discussing regulations issued 
by the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges). 
 65. E.g. id. at 762. 
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sue a company in a lower court if they believe that the company 
has disclosed false information.66 Shareholders are permitted to 
bring suit individually, or together, but they cannot bring a 
class action lawsuit.67
China acts in cooperation with other securities regulatory 
bodies on an international level. China is a member of the 
International Organization of Securities Commission 
(“IOSCO”), a non-profit institution that aids in the transfer of 
expertise between developing and developed countries.
 
68 While 
IOSCO has uniform regulatory rules, the rules are non-binding 
on members.69 Nevertheless, China’s membership in this 
international organization has helped increase the 
standardization of Chinese securities regulations through 
Memoranda of Understanding with foreign securities 
regulatory bodies.70 China is also a member of the International 
Accounting Standards Committee (“IASC”) which has helped 
develop a uniform standard of accounting endorsed by China’s 
Ministry of Finance.71 Cooperation with these bodies has helped 
shape the Chinese securities regulatory system and the 
practices of the CSRC, but the system is not without 
discrepancies that leave room for fraud.72
Within China, the CSRC supervises all public offerings. 
Only LLCs are approved by the CSRC to issue shares.
 
73 The 
application to go public requires reports from underwriters and 
auditors, all of whom may be held jointly and severally liable in 
the case of incomplete or false disclosures.74 The underwriter is 
a securities firm that sells the shares to investors on behalf of 
the company, as Chinese companies in China cannot sell 
directly to investors.75 A company’s underwriter works to 
ensure proper disclosure compliance.76
 
 66. See id. at 818–19. 
 The underwriter must 
take corrective action if it finds false information contained in 
the company’s prospectus and must also ensure that post-
 67. See id. at 819. 
 68. See JANE FU, CORPORATE DISCLOSURE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
IN CHINA 206 (2010). 
 69. See id. 
 70. See id.  
 71. See id. at 207. 
 72. See id. at 209. 
 73. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 59, at 773. 
 74. See id. 
 75. See id. at 776. 
 76. See id. at 773–74. 
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offering internal controls are effective.77 The CSRC also 
supervises the issuance of Chinese company stock abroad.78 
Chinese companies must submit an application to the CSRC, 
which includes financial and operational information, in order 
to seek approval for foreign share issuance.79
Chinese securities laws are based on basic principles of 
investor protection, increasing transparency and fairness, and 
working within a highly regulated industry.
 
80 Unsurprisingly, 
fraud is a prohibited trading activity.81 Entities involved in 
securities trading are forbidden from making “false or 
misleading statements or omissions concerning information 
that is material to the sale of stock” as well as from “forging, 
altering or destroying operational records or accounting books 
of the company in order to affect the issuance or trading of the 
company’s stock.”82 Similarly, it is a criminal offense to 
manipulate share prices by providing false information.83
In order to enforce such principles, Chinese corporations 
must keep detailed financial and administrative records of the 
company.
 
84 Not surprisingly, corporations are not eager to meet 
these requirements and China has not yet cultivated an 
environment conducive to disclosure.85 Chinese corporations 
must submit midterm and annual reports to the CSRC,86 
resembling the SEC requirements of Forms 10-Q and 10-K. At 
the end of a fiscal year, companies must provide a financial 
report that is to be audited by an auditing firm nominated by 
the shareholders or board.87 Corporations must provide all 
necessary and requested information to the auditors, and is 
also expressly forbidden from providing false information.88
 
 77. See id. at 774, 777. 
 If 
 78. See Id. at 793. 
 79. See id. 
 80. See 2 GAO LINGYUN & JIA XILING, SERIES ON CONTEMPORARY 
CHINESE LAW: CHINESE BUSINESS LAW 273 (Charles Wellford & Robert L. 
Jacobson eds., 2008). 
 81. See id. at 310. 
 82. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 59, at 790–91. 
 83. See id. at 1041. 
 84. See id. at 766 (stating that corporations must keep minutes of 
meetings, financial and accounting records, and the articles of association 
must include a number of listed items). 
 85. See FU, supra note 68, at 210–11. Compliance is seen as a burden and 
many companies only provide minimal information. Companies also avoid 
disclosure if it will hurt their share price. 
 86. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 59, at 784. 
 87. See LINGYUN & XILING, supra note 80, at 57–58. 
 88. See id. at 58. 
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the corporation experiences a material change or major event 
that could have a significant impact on the market value of its 
shares, it must file a report with the relevant stock exchange 
and the CSRC.89 Further, there are additional strict procedures 
for mergers and other capital changes, as corporations are 
required to notify creditors and make a public announcement 
within thirty days of completing such a transaction.90 
Disclosure exemptions, however, can be granted by the stock 
exchanges if the disclosure will damage the company’s 
interest.91
Yet even with the thorough regulatory framework, 
securities fraud in the form of false financial or operational 
information is still a problem.
 
92 Beginning in the mid-1990s a 
CRM firm, Sino-Forest, orchestrated a $4 billion dollar Ponzi 
scheme by fabricating information on its forestry operations.93 
Canadian and U.S. regulators and investors failed to realize 
Sino-Forest’s operations claimed to be far in excess even of 
what Chinese logging regulations allowed.94 By providing 
auditors with only 0.3% of company information (claiming the 
rest was competitive information)95 and obscuring the 
company’s structure with numerous subsidiaries, Sino-Forest 
defrauded investors for more than fifteen years. Due to both 
the company’s manipulations and the difficulty of verifying its 
information and assets, auditors were unable or unwilling to 
identify the basis for securities fraud.96
In 2002 a CSRC-conducted survey showed that at least one 
in ten publicly listed companies doctored its books.
 
97
 
 89. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 
 As a 
result, the securities laws were revised in 2005 for the 
protection of Chinese investors, allowing the government an 
increased ability to intervene, pushing for greater disclosure 
requirements, and increasing the penalties for securities 
59, at 785; cf. SEC, supra note 40.  
 90. See LINGYUN & XILING, supra note 80, at 54. 
 91. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 59, at 785. 
 92. E.g. Fung, supra note 14, at 253; FU, supra note 68, at 211 (finding 
that the high capital requirements for an IPO in China force some companies 
to decide to provide false information on profits). 
 93. See Carson C. Block, Muddy Waters Research, (June 2, 2011) 
http://www.muddywatersresearch.com/wp-
content/uploads/2011/06/MW_TRE_060211.pdf. 
 94. See id. at 14. 
 95. See id. at 2. 
 96. See id. at 1. 
 97. See Fung, supra note 14, at 253. 
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violations.98
A more comprehensive method of dealing with the 
inadequacies posed by Chinese domestic regulations would be 
to resort to common tools utilized in international law. While 
no standing bilateral or multilateral treaty addresses 
fraudulent reverse merger transactions, a treaty-based solution 
is the best way to halt the fraudulent CRM trend. In addition to 
tackling this specific type of transaction, a broad based 
securities and accounting treaty would be invaluable in shining 
greater light on international merger issues generally. 
 It remains doubtful whether these additional 
regulatory attempts will prove more resilient against such 
widespread tampering of financial statements. 
D. ADDRESSING CRMS THROUGH COMPETITION LAW 
Competition law, also referred to as antitrust law, aims to 
enhance market competition by regulating anti-competitive 
behavior.99 Competition laws, generally speaking, prohibit 
domestic anti-competitive conduct through substantive limits 
on business operations, procedural requirements of disclosure 
and auditing, or both. Developing as well as developed 
countries, however, are increasingly examining the scope of 
competition laws.100 Competition law generally encompasses 
regulations on mergers, anti-monopoly laws, and concerted 
conduct laws.101
Merger control laws were first enacted in China to address 
anti-competitive abuses by foreign corporations and 
investors.
 
102 As the Chinese market moved away from a 
government-planned economy, regulators sought to moderate 
the transition by enacting measures designed to combat anti-
competitive practices.103 These new laws, modeled after laws in 
the United States and the European Union,104
 
 98. See LINGYUN & XILING, supra note 
 focused China’s 
efforts generally on preventing harm to Chinese consumers and 
80, at 271, 273. 
 99. See MARTYN TAYLOR, INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW: A NEW 
DIMENSION FOR THE WTO? 1 (2006). 
 100. See MAHER M. DABBAH, INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE 
COMPETITION LAW 1 (Maher M. Dabbah & Barry Hawk eds., 2010). Cross-
border influence of domestic competition laws is not necessarily bilateral, but 
extends beyond that as some countries are actually using the competition laws 
of another as the model rules in their jurisdictions. See id. at 5. 
 101. See id. at 32-36. 
 102. See id. at 99. 
 103. See id. at 97. 
 104. See NEE & TAO, supra note 9, at 324. 
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specifically in controlling mergers and acquisitions.105 
Unfortunately, the usefulness of these regulations remains 
doubtful due to the spotty enforcement record.106
Whether there should be an international competition law 
is a hotly debated topic.
 Because of 
China’s emphasis on the merger transaction, the harm created 
by the CRM trend is beyond the scope of those regulations. 
While Chinese consumers may share in some of the harm of a 
fraudulent CRM, foreign investors also share exposure.  
107 Almost all competition laws have the 
broad purpose of serving economic, social, and political needs.108 
Competition laws do this through the promotion of trade and 
enhanced economic liberalization through privatization, 
helping to develop a market economy.109 Fraudulent financial 
reports by publicly traded companies have an anti-competitive 
effect on the market by negatively impacting consumer 
welfare.110
While international competition law does not fall under the 
purview of the WTO, there is a historical connection between 
trade laws and international competition laws.
 A bilateral or multilateral treaty could succeed at 
bringing international competition law into cross-border 
transactions. 
111 Both aim to 
increase economic efficiency as well as global and national 
welfare.112
 
 105. See SEUNG CHONG, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 96 (2007). 
 The draft charter for the International Trade 
Organization (“ITO”), established following World War II, had 
an ambitious goal, requiring multilateral regulations and 
monitoring of international anti-competitive behavior, but this 
was widely opposed and disregarded along with the Havana 
 106. See id. (noting that merger control hasn’t been a significant factor in 
transactions in China). 
 107. See DABBAH, supra note 100, at 1–2, 30–31 (noting that the scope of 
competition law has been growing and that debates on the purpose of 
competition law are expected to increase in the global context, also noting that 
international competition law has “give rise to serious disagreements”) 
 108. See id. at 39. 
 109. See id. at 41. These laws and goals are particularly important to 
economies in transition. See id. As China has only recently opened up, it is 
still new to the market economy and fits into this qualification. See id. 
 110. See id. Bork’s opinion is that courts should aim to maximize consumer 
wealth and satisfaction, requiring courts to prioritize efficiency and decrease 
harmful practices. Reporting fraud would likely be considered one of those 
practices. 
 111. See TAYLOR, supra note 99, at 148. In 1927, the League of Nations’ 
World Economic Forum recognized a need for coordinated regulatory attention 
at the international level to prevent anti-competitive conduct. 
 112. See id. at 167. 
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Charter as a whole.113 The General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (“GATT”), established in 1947, did not address the anti-
competitive trade practices that had been considered in the 
Havana Charter.114 However, member nations submitted 
initiatives to incorporate competition law into the GATT.115 In 
1993, the Uruguay Round concluded with the formation of the 
WTO, a modern version of the early ITO.116 Yet, the Uruguay 
Round agreements still did not include an agreement on 
international competition law.117 What the Round did 
accomplish however, was the creation of the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Investment Measures (“TRIMs”) which contains 
a review provision that allows TRIMs to address competition 
law at the discretion of the Council for Trade in Goods.118
In 1996, the WTO’s Ministerial Conference created a 
working group to look at anti-competitive behavior and 
determine whether an international competition law should be 
included in the WTO framework.
 
119 The Uruguay Round did 
establish a few provisions that address specific instances of 
anti-competitive conduct,120 but none address the problems 
associated with fraudulent financial reporting or disclosure 
requirements. Lamentably, the WTO seems to address 
competition law strictly on an ad hoc basis.121
E.CHINA’S INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
 
 
 113. See id. at 150–51. Ratification of the Havana Charter officially failed 
in 1950. See id. at 153. 
 114. See id. at 153–54. The GATT aimed to increase aggregate welfare by 
reducing trade barriers and eliminating discrimination. While the Kennedy 
Round (1967) and Tokyo Round (1979) increased the scope of the GATT by 
adding non-tariff barriers to trade, it still did not address competition law. See 
id. 
 115. See id. at 155. 
 116. See id. at 158–59. 
 117. See id. at 159. Member nations recognized the complex relationship 
between trade law and competition law and concluded that more investigation 
needed to be done on the subject. 
 118. See Uruguay Round Agreement: Agreement on Trade-Related 
Investment Measures, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/18-
trims_e.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2011) (referring to Art. 9, also known as the 
“review provision”). 
 119. See Clifford A. Jones & Mitsuo Matsushita, Preface to COMPETITION 
POLICY IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM v (Clifford A. Jones & Mitsuo 
Matsushita eds., 2002) (predicting that international competition would be an 
issue in the Doha Round). 
 120. See TAYLOR, supra note 99, at 159.  
 121. See id. at 163 (pointing to the fact that this highly localized approach 
is inconsistent with the overall unified methods and purpose of the WTO 
agreements). 
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TREATIES 
China became a member of the WTO in 2001 by 
committing to a number of trade-liberalizing agreements. 
These agreements have one effect, among others, of increasing 
competition.122 This increased competition has shaped China’s 
law on both domestic and foreign investment.123 China has 
shown a willingness to be a greater actor in international 
investment activities by becoming a party to both bilateral and 
multilateral treaties on the subject.124 In the absence of a 
relevant multilateral agreement, China has created numerous 
bilateral agreements on investment promotion with countries 
around the world.125 For example, China has a bilateral 
agreement with India that requires each government to 
encourage investments and protect the interest of investors in 
both countries.126
To summarize, while they may be potential vehicles for 
fraud, reverse mergers are likely to continue to exist, as they 
are an appealing alternative as compared with IPOs for private 
companies seeking to enter the public market. Unilateral action 
by the SEC, CSRC, and other relevant agencies has proved 
insufficient as a means of preventing fraud. Rampant 
accounting and disclosure fraud and a lack of enforcement of 
accounting standards within China present an international 
problem, requiring a solution through international law. 
 
II. EVALUATING SOLUTIONS TO THE CRM PROBLEM 
Regardless of whether courts find fraud to be present in 
the pending cases, the underlying cause of the shareholder 
class action lawsuits appears to be the auditing practices of 
CRMs. Auditors utilizing this faulty accounting information 
allow the continued recycling of baseless financial reports.127
 
 122. See LIU XIAOHONG ET AL., SERIES ON CONTEMPORARY CHINESE LAW: 
CHINESE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 230 (Charles Wellford & Lauryn 
Beer eds., 2008). 
 
Unilateral action by the SEC or other U.S. agencies is 
insufficient to protect American shareholders, highlighting the 
 123. See id. at 129. 
 124. See id. at 128. 
 125. See id. 
 126. See id. 
 127. See Gordon, supra note 16; Luk, supra note 3, at 15 (“Almost three in 
four Chinese reverse merger companies are audited by U.S. auditors, but as 
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board highlighted in a March 
report, some of these firms do not seem to be doing their job properly.”). 
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need for a solution employing international law.128 However, 
many international law options, while good in theory, are not 
feasible in practice. Bilateral investment treaties are too 
narrow in scope, and a multilateral agreement on investment, 
while sufficiently broad in scope, is likely too politically charged 
to gain traction in international negotiations.129 Using 
international competition law to mandate a standard for 
accounting and auditing between China and the United States 
is the optimal solution. With China increasingly focusing on 
antitrust concerns and reviewing cross-border transactions,130
A. UNILATERAL U.S. REGULATION IS INSUFFICIENT TO ADDRESS 
THE CRM PROBLEM 
 
transitioning the audit process to China under U.S. accounting 
standards would, at a minimum, grant auditors greater access 
to a company prior to its entrance into U.S. securities markets. 
Coupling greater access with more stringent accounting 
standards will go a long way to combating the fraud potential 
posed by CRMs. 
Prior regulatory attempts to address CRM fraud merely 
changed the time frame given to the company to provide the 
SEC with audited financial information.131 The 2005 Form 8-K 
disclosure requirement did not offer incentives to reverse 
mergers to provide more accurate or transparent information. 
Given the nature of the reverse merger the SEC is not in a 
position to provide IPO-type heightened scrutiny under the 
Securities Act,132
The risks and regulatory challenges posed by reverse 
merger transactions leaves open the question of whether or not 
this transaction should simply be eliminated. Such a 
proposition is not easily attempted, however, since the SEC 
 leaving room for the transmission of 
fraudulent information. Short of converting the reverse merger 
transaction into an IPO, it seems that increased SEC 
regulations will not necessarily negate that transmission 
potential. In any event, the negligence occurs at earlier stages 
when inadequate audits are performed. 
 
 128. See, e.g., Luk, supra note 3, at 15 (discussing the futility of auditing 
with respect to CRMs with recent examples). 
 129. See KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 1 
(2010); CHEN HUIPING, OECD MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT: A 
CHINESE PERSPECTIVE 8–12 (2002). 
 130. See REGIONALISM, MULTILATERALISM, AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
94 (Gary P. Sampson & Stephen Woolcock eds., 2003). 
 131. See Pavkov, supra note 22, at 484.  
 132. See id. 
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cannot prohibit them per se.133 Even if it were possible for the 
SEC to do so, outlawing reverse mergers would be an over-
inclusive solution to the fraud perpetuated by a select number 
of CRMs. Prohibiting all reverse mergers would deny investors 
access to investments in “embryonic companies with high 
growth potential” to those who are not venture capitalists.134 As 
most small companies are high-risk and unable to attract 
venture capital, investment bankers or underwriters are 
unlikely to take on a costly and time consuming IPO process, 
making the IPO track an unattractive option to raise capital.135
Both the company and the external auditor, as opposed to 
just the company, should face liability for fraudulent 
disclosures. Recently, the SEC has shown a willingness to 
prosecute CRM accounting firms, embracing this principle.
 
For this type of small, but high growth potential company, a 
reverse merger is a more cost effective method of reaching the 
equity markets. The solution is not to restrict market entry 
only to IPOs. A better solution is to gain control over the 
accounting and auditing process performed by or for foreign 
companies. 
136 In 
2010, the SEC investigated Moore Stephens Wurth Frazer & 
Torbet LLP, a PCAOB U.S.–registered accounting firm that 
performed audits for many CRMs.137 The investigation revealed 
that the firm failed to perform the correct financial evaluations, 
choosing instead to rely on management’s representations, even 
after discovering in 2004 that the client’s internal controls 
could not reasonably be relied upon.138
 
 133. See Dena Aubin & Andrea Shalal-Esa, INSIGHT — Where Was SEC 
As Trouble Festered At Chinese Companies?, REUTERS, July 10, 2011, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/10/china-accounting-enforcement-
idUSN1E76905A20110710. 
 In many cases, however, 
there is no such history of facial misrepresentation by the 
 134. See Pavkov, supra note 22, at 489. 
 135. See Pavkov, supra note 22, at 489 (“Due to the economics of IPOs, 
early stage companies are not generally courted by underwriters and brought 
to market through the traditional process . . . . Smaller businesses simply do 
not make it over the IPO hurdle.”). 
 136. See, e.g., Andrea Shalal-Esa & Sarah N. Lynch, Exclusive: Justice 
Department Probing Chinese Accounting, REUTERS, Sept. 29, 2011, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/29/us-china-usa-accounting-
idUSTRE78S3QM20110929 (last visited Mar. 7, 2012) (discussing Department 
of Justice subpoenas of an arm of Deloitte Touche in Shanghai). 
 137. See Luk, supra note 3, at 18. 
 138. See Bob Scott, SEC Suspends California Audit Partner, THE 
PROGRESSIVE ACCT. (Dec. 20, 2010, 11:42 PM), 
http://www.theprogressiveaccountant.com/news/sec-suspends-california-audit-
partner.html. 
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Chinese company.139 Chinese companies may simply be taking 
advantage of the limitations faced by U.S. auditors, and 
depending on those limitations to obscure financial 
misrepresentations.140 Auditors, feeling the heat of SEC 
warnings and investigations, have suggested as much. George 
Qin, the head of MaloneBailey, LLP’s China audits, stated that 
“it is the companies who are committing fraud,” not the 
auditors.141
Shareholder lawsuits claiming violations of securities 
regulations are also an ineffective solution. The class action 
lawsuit brought against China North East Petroleum Holding 
Ltd. (“China North”) in June 2010 was one of the first in the 
series of cases filed against CRM companies.
 While it is clear in some cases that the SEC has a 
case against an auditing firm, such smoking gun evidence is 
the exception rather than the rule. 
142 Shareholders 
brought suit after a series of announcements made by China 
North, during which time the share prices fluctuated.143 Share 
prices were adversely affected when China North announced 
that its previous financial statements may have been 
incorrect.144 A few months later, China North issued a Form 8-
K that announced the company had misreported its net income 
by almost 100%.145 The court granted China North’s motion to 
dismiss, holding that the shareholders had opportunities to sell 
without suffering a loss, meaning the loss they did suffer could 
not be attributed to alleged misrepresentations.146
This case is relevant in considering the potential for the 
United States to develop a unilateral solution. The Form 8-K 
was not considered by the court, because the claim failed to 
  
 
 139. See Luk, supra note 3, at 15. 
 140. As of March 2010 that firm had performed ten CRM audits, the most 
of any other firm. See id. at 17. 
 141. See id. at 15. 
 142. See In re China N. E. Petroleum Holdings Sec. Litig., 2011 WL 
4801516 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2011). See also Kevin LaCroix, Securities Suit 
Against U.S.–Listed Chinese Company Dismissed, THE D&O DIARY (Oct. 20, 
2011, 10:15 AM), http://www.dandodiary.com/2011/10/articles/securities-
litigation/securities-suit-against-uslisted-chinese-company-dismissed/. 
 143. See LaCroix, supra note 142. 
 144. See Complaint at 3, In re China N.E. Petroleum Holdings Sec. Litig., 
2011 WL 4801516 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2011) (No. 10-CV-04577-MGC). 
 145. See id. at 3–5 (stating that as earnings were actually $10.5M instead 
of $19.5M, corruption was found to be likely, so the NYSE AMEX suspended 
trading until September, but when trading resumed the share price fell 47% 
from $9.37 to $4.42). 
 146. See LaCroix, supra note 142. 
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survive early motions to dismiss.147 Shareholders bear a 
considerable burden in claiming fraud as they must meet the 
heightened pleading standard required by Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 9(b) and Exchange Act Rule10b-5, which requires 
that the defendant knowingly or recklessly provided deceptive 
information in connection with the purchase of securities.148
Even for shareholders that are able to obtain U.S. 
judgments, they face substantial difficulty in recovering from 
the Chinese company. The shareholders of Orient Paper, Inc. 
claimed that reported revenues were substantially overstated 
due to Orient Paper’s false disclosures of operations in China.
 
Therefore, even if the SEC were to develop an elaborate set of 
laws that could detect fraud before it damaged shareholders, it 
would not resolve the hurdle of heightened pleading 
requirements. 
149 
The 2008 Form 10-K had been audited by a disbarred auditor 
and shareholders were suspicious of the CEO’s ownership of 
seventy per cent of one of the suppliers.150 In July 2011, the 
court found a strong inference of scienter in the alleged 
conduct, dismissing the defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment.151
Despite this favorable judgment, “[t]he enforcement of 
foreign judgments in China has been notoriously difficult in 
recent years.”
  
152 As these companies are based primarily in 
China, with substantially all of their operations occurring in 
China, the funds are not accessible by U.S. judgment without 
the approval of a Chinese court.153
 
 147. See In re China N. E. Petroleum Holdings Sec. Litig., 2011 WL 
4801516 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2011). 
 Though in theory the court 
may grant a judgment against the parent corporation as all of 
 148. Plaintiff-shareholders must support all allegations of securities fraud 
with the “who, what, when, where, and how” of the events. Claiming a 
violation under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 require at least an inference of scienter. 
See In re Heckmann Corp. Sec. Litig., 2011 WL 2413999, at *8 (D. Del. June 
16, 2011). 
 149. See Amended Complaint at 3, Henning v. Orient Paper, Inc., 2011 WL 
1160486 (C.D. Cal. July 20, 2011) (No. 2:10-CV-05887-VBF-AJW). 
 150. See id. at 5. 
 151. See id. 
 152. See Arthur Anyuan Yuan, Enforcing and Collecting Money Judgments 
in China From a U.S. Judgment Creditor’s Perspective, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. 
REV. 757, 758 (2004). 
 153. See Gillis, supra note 31 (stating that there is also no way to enforce 
the defendant corporation to appear in court which would result in a default 
judgment against them, again, with no way to be enforce the judgment); Yuan, 
supra note 152. 
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its board members and principal officers reside and work in 
China, Chinese courts are not likely to recognize the foreign 
judgment on the grounds that it is contrary to “state 
sovereignty, security and/or public policy.”154
U.S. stock exchanges do possess some power to enforce 
compliance with securities regulations.
 
155 In the case of China 
North, for example, the NYSE AMEX determined that 
corruption was likely involved and suspended shares from 
trading.156 However, this had the effect of damaging 
shareholders who had not yet sold their shares as the share 
price fell by forty-seven per cent157
A unilateral solution devised by the United States will be 
insufficient to prevent future misleading information from 
entering the U.S. public market. As suggested by a senior 
partner with PKF, a major auditing firm involved in CRM 
audits, closer cooperation between the countries would help 
with the audit quality.
 when trading finally 
resumed. While suspending trade could have a deterrence 
effect for companies considering filing false disclosures, it is 
rather a weak post hoc solution that fails to protect 
unsuspecting shareholders. 
158
B. UNILATERAL CHINESE REGULATION IS UNLIKELY OR 
INSUFFICIENT TO ADDRESS THE CRM PROBLEM 
 A cross-jurisdictional solution of 
cooperation between firms would enable U.S. firms to rely on 
the assistance provided by Chinese firms familiar with the 
area, language, and business environment, provided they have 
the quality of professional standards to be PCAOB certified. 
But this solution seems unlikely without a body that would 
oversee and enforce the Chinese audit process. 
 No agency in China expressly regulates private companies 
merging with foreign public corporations.159
 
 154. See Yuan, supra note 
 The most efficient 
solution to the CRM trend is for the CSRC, which controls the 
issuance of Chinese company stock outside of China through 
the Overseas Share Regulations, to formulate new regulations 
152, at 767. 
 155. See Luk, supra note 3, at 14. 
 156. See Complaint at 16, In re China N.E. Petroleum Holdings Sec. Litig., 
2010 WL 2483602 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2010) (No. 10-CV-4577). 
 157. See id. 
 158. As of March 2010 that firm had performed ten CRM audits, the most 
of any other firm. See Luk, supra note 3, at 17. 
 159. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 59, at 793–94 (showing that the CSRC is 
limited to regulations dealing only with the issuance of Chinese companies 
outside of China). 
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that directly regulate CRMs.160
 Currently, CRMs escape extensive review by both the SEC 
and the CSRC. Normally the CSRC would oversee an 
application process that reviews financial and operational 
information before a company would be allowed to issue stock 
abroad.
 Unfortunately, this is not likely. 
161 This type of review, however, only extends to 
“regulated transactions.” Reverse mergers are not considered 
regulated transactions within China’s new merger control 
regime — a regime which regulates the acquisition of domestic 
companies by foreign entities.162
 This domestic solution is not without challenges. First, 
there is a glaring lack of regulatory will. Policy makers in 
China actively promote foreign direct investment (“FDI”) as 
opposed to foreign indirect investment (“FII”), represented by 
reverse mergers. 
 Regulated transactions 
undergo mandatory review, with an eye to antitrust violations. 
If reverse mergers were included within the regulated 
transaction umbrella, the CSRC review would function as a 
preliminary audit of the company’s overall position. This could 
effectively prevent fraudulent information from reaching U.S. 
markets. In this way, information disclosed by U.S.–listed 
Chinese companies would have been audited in China in the 
first instance by auditors with experience in the Chinese 
business environment and proficiency in the language. 
163 In fact, reverse mergers run counter to 
Chinese policies and China’s regulation of foreign 
investment.164
 
 160. See id. at 793. 
 The failure by regulators to address this 
inconsistency either by prohibiting reverse mergers or 
including it as a regulated transaction is striking. It is likely 
that Chinese policy makers considered the conduct of private 
companies partaking in a foreign reverse merger and 
subsequently decided to forego any meaningful regulation. 
 Second, there is no way to ensure or require Chinese 
regulators to provide the quality of professional auditing or 
accounting standards required by the PCAOB. It is widely 
 161. See id. The review also consists of an offering plan, prospectus, and 
accounting records.  
 162. See CHONG, supra note 105, at 99 (describing the new merger control 
regime as limited and developing in jurisprudence). 
 163. See NORAH GALLAGHER & WENHUA SHAN, CHINESE INVESTMENT 
TREATIES 8 (Loukas Mistelis ed., 2009). 
 164. See CHONG, supra note 105, at 86–90. Indirect investment does not 
directly contribute to development as it is merely money held within a 
corporation which can be retained, distributed, or otherwise disposed of 
without improving infrastructure. 
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acknowledged that the laxity of domestic Chinese accounting 
standards makes the purchase of Chinese stock risky.165 To 
meet the high standard of U.S. IPO requirements, many 
Chinese companies simply submit fabricated information.166 
While the CSRC has attempted to develop a stronger disclosure 
regime in the hope of creating a less deceptive market, its 
attempts have remained largely unsuccessful.167 Despite 
membership in IOSCO and IASC, China’s accounting 
standards still lag behind most Western economies.168
 Third, the threshold test for mandatory review under 
merger law is the existence of a major factor that may seriously 
affect market competition. Without a history of interpretation 
of the “major factor” threshold, it is unlikely that reverse 
merger review would occur. Fourth, without the Chinese 
company disclosing that it will be entering into a CRM, there is 
little reason to assume a relevant authority would be aware of 
the transaction in order to notify the Ministry of Commerce 
(“MOFCOM”).
 
169
 A number of provisions of Chinese law could ensure review 
of CRM company reports on financial and operations 
information prior to review by U.S. auditors.
 
170
 
 165. See Tan Wentao, China’s Stock Market, in CHINA’S FINANCIAL 
MARKETS 209 (Salih N. Neftci & Michelle Yuan Ménager-Xu eds., 2007) 
(claiming the accounting system inadequately protects investors). 
 They appear to 
have been little used at this point. If Chinese auditors had 
carefully reviewed the information submitted by Sino-Forest 
Corporation as an introductory step to a CRM, it is very likely 
that Sino-Forest would never have entered a public market. 
Even so, it is unlikely that the United States will be able to rely 
on the integrity of the Chinese auditors until the “soft law” 
from IOSCO or China’s membership in IASC starts to show 
marked implementation into China’s systems. In the 
 166. See FU, supra note 68, at 209 (finding that many companies forge 
profit information in order to obtain IPO approval). 
 167. See id. at 201. Chinese shareholders have a culture of relying on 
sources outside company disclosures to determine share health. Shareholders 
tend to not rely on disclosures because they are frequently false. See id. 
(describing that many investors based knowledge from friends and relatives). 
Further, without the rule of law enforcement is more difficult and many 
corporate officers simply continue to provide false information to meet 
disclosure requirements. See id. at 209. 
 168. See id. at 205 (discussing the lax standards of Chinese investment 
regulation). 
 169. See id. (stating that the threshold test for mandatory review was 
meant to be a low standard so as to catch as much as possible). 
 170. See generally id. at 201–02 (discussing the Securities Law of 1998 and 
CRSC crackdown as examples of China’s actions on securities regulation). 
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meantime, it is worth considering hard law options between the 
two countries, to be discussed infra. 
C. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW IS INSUFFICIENT TO 
ADDRESS THE CRM PROBLEM 
International organizations have prompted the WTO to 
consider an international investment law, as many countries 
have developed their own laws on cross-border investment.171 
As discussed, supra, bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”) are 
common tools for this area, but lack the scope to adequately 
address the problem. Generally BITs only apply to FDI.172 
Seeing as this is not the type of investment involved in a 
reverse merger, a BIT would largely be unhelpful. A 
multilateral agreement on investment (“MAI”), however, is 
broad enough to encompass the accounting and disclosure 
issues of a reverse merger.173 While an MAI is the most suitable 
treaty-based solution, in practice investment policy is very 
politically sensitive and thus an MAI is not likely to be adopted 
by the WTO.174
1. BITs Cannot Address Reverse Merger Indirect Investment 
Issues 
 
The purpose of a BIT is to attract FDI between the 
contracting countries.175 China, currently focused on 
encouraging FDI in certain industries, not FII,176 has identified 
three main goals of a BIT: (1) facilitate and attract investment; 
(2) contribute to the prosperity of both contracting states; and 
(3) cooperate on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.177
BITs may appear to have a purpose broad enough to target 
the accounting and auditing problems arising from private 
Chinese companies, but so far none have emerged. A BIT 
proposed by the United States to China to protect international 
investors from fraud perpetuated by Chinese companies 
through inadequate disclosure enforcement and accounting 
 
 
 171. See generally Peter Holmes, Trade & Competition Policy: At the WTO 
Issues for Developing Countries (Ctr. on Regulation and Competition, 2003) 
(discussing barriers to a WTO competition law and the issues any such law 
should consider). 
 172. See GALLAGHER & SHAN, supra note 163, at 49. 
 173. See HUIPING, supra note 129, at 7. 
 174. See id. at 8–12 (chronicling the history of attempts to negotiate an 
MAI). 
 175. See GALLAGHER & SHAN, supra note 163. 
 176. Reverse mergers are a type of FII. 
 177. See GALLAGHER & SHAN, supra note 163. 
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standards is not likely to enter serious negotiations.178
BITs are interpreted narrowly and are not currently used 
in China to target indirect investment.
 If a 
treaty were to be agreed upon, the additional problem of 
enforcement remains. 
179 Typically, the 
investing party is able to impose obligations on China through 
this process in exchange for investments to help the 
development of the Chinese economy and infrastructure.180 
While the purpose of a BIT is usually to reassure the investor 
that its investments are being used accordingly,181 this does not 
mean that a BIT between China and the United States could 
not cover indirect investment. But problems would arise in the 
interpretation of indirect investment as there is almost no 
mention of it in other BITs, making the definition ethereal.182 If 
a breach of the agreement did occur, which is likely given the 
distinct political goals of China and the United States, 
arbitration is not likely to provide a satisfying solution.183
With 126 BITs, China has one of the most extensive treaty 
networks to protect international investments.
 
184 Surprisingly, 
it has not entered into an agreement with the United States.185 
China and the United States entered BIT negotiations in 1983, 
but each country had very different issues it wanted to address; 
thus frustrating and eventually ending the negotiations.186 If 
the United States were to propose an agreement containing 
sufficient regulations on accounting and disclosure issues, 
China would be unlikely to negotiate seriously.187 While such 
reform would be vital to China’s growth in FII and the 
development of the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock markets,188
 
 178. See HUIPING, supra note 
 
129, at 6–7. 
 179. See VANDEVELDE, supra note 129, at 1–2. 
 180. See id. at 108. 
 181. See id. at 1–2. 
 182. See id. at 139. 
 183. See generally Duncan Hollis, What Will A U.S.-China BIT Do To 
Investor-State Arbitrations, OPINIO JURIS (Mar. 22, 2010), 
http://opiniojuris.org/2010/03/22/what-will-a-us-china-bit-do-to-investor-state-
arbitrations/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2012) (discussing the challenges posed in 
developing a BIT that will soothe both countries’ regulatory fears). 
 184. See VANDEVELDE, supra note 129,  at 31. 
 185. See id. at 32. 
 186. Disagreement over the national treatment standard of the treaty was 
the primary stumbling block. See id. at 33. 
 187. See id. (arguing that the “highly prescriptive formula” embraced by 
the United States will make it difficult to negotiate a BIT). 
 188. See id. at 8 (claiming that China modified many laws in order to 
attract more FDI and national investors). 
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China prefers to focus on attracting FDI. Additionally, it seems 
unlikely that the United States would be able to assert 
sufficient pressure on MOFCOM to motivate it to propose a 
treaty to the State Council189
2. An MAI Is Not A Practical Solution 
 that would require Chinese audits 
and corporate disclosures to meet the standard required in the 
United States. 
While an MAI could properly address the issues raised by 
indirect investment and minimum accounting standard 
requirements, the recent history of failed attempts suggests 
that the WTO is not currently able to address this issue.190 In 
1995, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (“OECD”), of which China is not a member, 
initiated negotiations to form an MAI.191
A multilateral agreement on investment would 
provide a strong and comprehensive framework for 
international investment and would strengthen the 
multilateral trading regime.  It would set clear, 
consistent and transparent rules on liberalization and 
investor protection . . . .
 A report by the OECD 
on the purpose of MAIs states that: 
192
When negotiations in the OECD stagnated and failed, the 
OECD proposed that the WTO be the body to form such an 
agreement.
 
193 The WTO did not foreclose forming a treaty on 
international investments and a working group was created to 
look at the relationship between trade and investment.194
 
 189. See id. at 33–34 (discussing the process in which the MOFCOM 
applies to the State Council for negotiation of a treaty). 
 While 
developed countries were not able to get an investment treaty 
on the Doha Round agenda, there remains a possibility that 
there will be a WTO treaty on the issue in the future, despite 
 190. See generally HUIPING, supra note 129, at 1 (discussing the multiple 
attempts of the WTO to create an MAI). 
 191. See id. For a list of OECD member countries see List of OECD 
Member Countries–Ratification of Convention on the OECD, OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,3343,en_2649_201185_1889402_1_1_1_1,0
0.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2012). 
 192. OECD, Rep. by the Comm. on Int’l Inv. and Multinational Enters. 
(CIME) and the Comm. on Capital Movements and Invisible Transactions 
(CMIT), A Multilateral Agreement on Investment, DAFFE/CMIT/CIME 
(95)13/Final, 5 May 1995, 1. 
 193. See HUIPING, supra note 129, at 1. 
 194. See id. The WTO formed a Working Group in 1996 following the 
Ministerial Conference in Singapore to create rules for multilateral 
investment treaties. 
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unsuccessful past attempts.195 However, the likelihood and 
nearness of such a development is dubious.196
The WTO had previously enacted TRIMs, which is covered 
by the Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”).
 A more 
immediate solution is needed to prevent fraud in the U.S. 
market from private Chinese companies. 
197 The DSU 
provides a mandatory forum for dispute resolution among 
member countries, such as China and the United States.198 
However, TRIMs does not specifically cover issues raised by 
reverse mergers.199 TRIMs, introduced at the Uruguay Round, 
deals with the concept of regulating foreign investment as part 
of international trade.200 While TRIMs deals with investment, it 
is not directly applicable to ensuring Chinese audits and 
disclosures meet U.S. standards for indirect investment.201 
TRIMs requires compliance with GATT, particularly the 
principle of national treatment under Article III:4 on internal 
regulations.202 This principle requires that China not impose 
domestic regulations that treat other countries less favorably.203
An MAI would establish an investment code to protect the 
interests of all parties in an investment transaction. However, 
as was the case with a BIT, the primary purpose of an MAI is 
 
There is no evidence that China treats U.S. investments 
different from others, nor is there evidence that accountants, 
auditors, or corporate directors provide different information to 
U.S.–listed Chinese companies than they do to Chinese 
companies in other countries. It therefore appears that the 
TRIMs agreement is not applicable as a mechanism for 
enhancing China’s accounting and disclosure standards. 
 
 195. See id.; see also SURYA P. SUBEDI, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
52 (2008) (finding that while this topic was on the WTO agenda for discussion, 
it was abandoned it in 2004). 
 196. See HUIPING, supra note 129, at 1 (discussing that there remains only 
some chance that formal negotiations will be held on investment rules in the 
WTO). 
 197. See WTO, Legal Texts: The WTO Agreements, 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ursum_e.htm#Understanding (last 
visited Feb. 13, 2012) (describing the DSU and TRIMS). 
 198. See id. 
 199. See SUBEDI, supra note 195, at 37 (showing TRIMS does not mention 
reverse mergers in the article text dealing with foreign investment). 
 200. See id. 
 201. See id. (arguing that TRIMS was applicable only to international 
instruments such as the GATT). 
 202. See id.  
 203. See id. 
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the regulation of FDI.204 As China is one of the world’s largest 
FDI recipients, such an agreement would have a direct effect 
upon investment to and from China.205 MAIs, though, could also 
encompass broad issues as well, including indirect investment, 
making this a more relevant solution than a BIT; as described 
by the OECD, the goal of an MAI is to “set high standards for 
the treatment and protection of investment.”206
Critics have complained that this type of agreement is a 
Bill of Rights for foreign investors.
 
207
An MAI negotiated and agreed upon as a multilateral 
agreement within the WTO could subsequently be added to the 
covered agreements within the WTO DSU. This would provide 
all parties with a mandatory venue for dispute settlement and 
interpretation of terms within the agreement. The DSU does 
not follow a stare decisis tradition, but instead has 
accumulated legislation.
 However, if the purpose is 
to promote growth and development it is more than reasonable 
to accord investors, whose money makes possible that growth 
and development, certain internationally agreed-upon rights. 
The protection of investment and aim to liberalize trade seem 
to go hand-in-hand with a need to create a solid foundation in 
accounting, auditing, corporate disclosure, and enforcement 
regimes. While reverse mergers are primarily a problem 
between China and the United States, other forms of 
investment could benefit from being able to rely on information 
provided to Chinese stock markets. Meeting U.S. standards 
would help ensure that more accurate information reaches 
investors and that the stock market reflects the actual 
performance of the listed companies.  
208
 
 204. See SUBEDI, supra note 
 This legislation provides parties 
with guidance on how to draft and interpret agreements in an 
attempt to avoid future arbitration. The presence of a dispute 
settlement body could have the effect of increasing compliance 
with the MAI. While a non-WTO based MAI is possible, it is not 
preferable to the standardized enforcement and dispute 
resolution tools of the WTO. 
195, at 40. 
 205. See GALLAGHER & SHAN, supra note 163, at 2 n.2 (finding that China 
attracted a record $53 billion in FDI). 
 206. See SUBEDI, supra note 195, at 40 (citing OECD Rep. by the Comm. on 
Int’l Inv. and Multinational Enters. (CIME) and the Comm. on Capital 
Movements and Invisible Transactions (CMIT), A Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment, DAFFE/CMIT/CIME (95)13/Final, 5 May 1995, 1). 
 207. Critics claimed the MAI gave no thought to the social obligations of 
investors. See id. at 41. 
 208. See WTO, supra note 197, (describing how the DSU settles claims). 
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While an MAI might offer a potential solution to the 
problems posed by CRMs, the political appetite for such 
measures is lacking among WTO members. The Doha Round 
abandoned negotiations on foreign investment as it found the 
topic to be too complex for the WTO to accommodate.209 With 
the wide variety of interests of member countries they were not 
able to even come to an agreement on the meaning of the term 
“foreign direct investment.”210 Some members are so 
disillusioned by the prior failed negotiations on the matter that 
many are reluctant to consider anything similar.211
III. THE CRM PROBLEM IS BEST ADDRESSED THROUGH 
A PLURILATERAL AGREEMENT 
 It therefore 
appears that an MAI through the WTO is not a realistic 
mechanism for enhancing China’s standards of accounting or 
corporate disclosures. 
China is not likely to unilaterally increase enforcement of 
auditing and accounting standards without hard law 
pressuring or incentivizing enforcement. China’s recent 
enactment of antitrust laws provides a basis for using 
competition law to review cross-border transactions, such as 
reverse mergers.212
Instead of a BIT, an MAI, or a TRIMs solution, discussed 
supra, the United States should pursue a plurilateral 
agreement through the WTO. This agreement would focus on 
macro issues of international competition law. In the 
background of a macro competition law, China and the United 
States could then engage in a bilateral agreement on the micro 
issues, including auditing and accounting standards. Through 
this approach, the risks of reverse mergers would be addressed. 
 
 
 209. See SUBEDI, supra note 195, at 154; see also Magnus Feldmann, The 
Association Agreement between the European Union and Poland, in 
REGIONALISM, MULTILATERALISM, AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, supra note 
130, at 51–52 (describing the process of establishing multilateral rules on 
foreign investment as “complex and tortuous”). 
 210. See SUBEDI, supra note 195, at 154 (finding that WTO member states 
could not agree what an international treaty on FDI would cover). 
 211. See Joakim Reiter, The EU–Mexico Free Trade Agreement: Assessing 
the EU Approach to Regulatory Issues, in REGIONALISM, MULTILATERALISM, 
AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, supra note 130, at 94. 
 212. See HERBERT SMITH, Chinese Antitrust Law Enacted at Last, (Aug. 30, 
2007), http://www.herbertsmith.com/NR/rdonlyres/6E845328-5888-4D0B-
8DEF-FFA0C7C1EE56/4545/ChineseAntitrustLawenactedatlast.htm (last 
visited Feb. 13, 2012) (calling the newly enacted legislation “comprehensive in 
scope”). 
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A. CHINA’S ANTI-MONOPOLY LAWS PROVIDE FRAMEWORK FOR 
IMPROVING ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 
In 2008, China introduced antitrust laws after fourteen 
years of legislative drafting.213 The Anti-Monopoly Law (“AML”) 
encompasses a prohibition on monopolistic agreements, 
exploitive behavior, and government restraint of competition.214 
Crucially, the AML provides for merger review.215 The existence 
of the AML is meant to encourage practitioners to consider the 
implications of merger or reverse merger transactions.216 Such a 
review, focused on assessing the “effect of elimination or 
restricting competition,”217 would require consideration of a 
company’s market power. In order to adequately consider a 
company’s market power, it stands to reason that regulators 
must be privy to correct and complete financial and operational 
information. The AML requires companies considering a 
merger to file audited financial and accounting reports from the 
past year.218 Once filed, MOFCOM can take up to thirty days to 
review and submit a notification of approval or require further 
investigation, delaying the transaction by up to ninety days.219
This domestic backdrop is well suited to the applicability of 
an international competition law. AML is based on many of the 
same principles enshrined in competition law generally. 
Inculcating strong accounting standards for domestic mergers 
is likely to have a spillover effect on cross-border transactions, 
of which mergers are a part, necessarily implicating 
competition law. 
 
220
B. A PLURILATERAL AGREEMENT IS THE BEST FRAMEWORK FOR 
 
 
 213. See NEE & TAO, supra note 9, at 324. The competition laws are 
modeled after EU and U.S. competition laws. 
 214. See id. at 325. 
 215. See id. 
 216. See id. (demonstrating that the AML requires practitioners to consider 
possible sanctions, market restrictions, and prior approval rules when 
merging). 
 217. See id. at 339 (citing The Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic 
of China, Art. 28 (adopted at the 29th meeting of the Standing Committee of 
the Tenth National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China, Aug. 
30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), translation available at 
http://www.china.org.cn/government/laws/2009-02/10/content_17254169.htm)). 
 218. Additionally, companies must file a notification of merger, a statement 
explaining the impact of the merger on competition, and the concentration 
agreement. See id. at 337. 
 219. See id. at 338. 
 220. See TAYLOR, supra note 99, at 36 (discussing the rise of cross-border 
mergers as a part competition law). 
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ESTABLISHING AN INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW 
The United States, China, and other WTO members have 
the ability to draft and enforce a comprehensive competition 
law within WTO forums. This is an imperfect, yet novel, 
approach to solving the accounting and disclosure issues 
highlighted by the current CRM litigation. Competition law is 
capable of filling the gap presented by the U.S. and Chinese 
securities laws and enforcement issues. Investment regulations 
can be seen as an integral part of competition law. The 
differences in financial standards between the United States 
and China leave international investors vulnerable with almost 
no protections. While investment regulation in China is a very 
politically sensitive area and a proposed agreement between 
China and the United States is not likely to be well received, 
competition law provides a usable platform for further 
regulations. China has recognized that there is benefit to be 
derived from competition law221
The WTO would provide an ideal system for dispute 
resolution, helping to drive compliance and enforcement of the 
treaty. With enforcement as one of the current problems, 
adoption of such a voluntary plurilateral agreement by the 
WTO would provide injured parties of member countries with 
procedures to obtain compensation for damage caused by 
fraudulent information. 
 and the WTO presents the most 
logical enforcement body. 
The plurilateral status of the agreement would ensure that 
countries could enter the treaty voluntarily. China and the 
United States may be able to find common ground in 
competition law. The agreement could be drafted to require 
enforcement of related micro issues between signing parties in 
a bilateral agreement to be enforceable within the plurilateral 
agreement. 
While Chinese and American competition laws appear to 
be converging,222
 
 221. See id. at 91–92 (discussing competition laws China has enacted to 
prohibit firms of a specific market threshold from engaging in certain 
conduct). 
 the recent surge of litigation surrounding 
CRMs suggests that something more needs to be done in the 
interim to ensure proper financial disclosures are made and 
that auditing standards are followed. Plurilateral and bilateral 
agreements on international competition laws could address 
issues in both China and the United States in furtherance of 
 222. See id. at 90–91 (showing that U.S. and Chinese competition laws are 
both being developed around the same behavioral thresholds). 
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each country’s own political and economic agendas. 
Rather than focusing directly on FDI and FII in MAIs, 
promoting regulation that would affect CRMs through 
international competition law stands a better chance of 
approval by WTO members. The plurilateral agreement would 
generally mirror the current AML within China and the 
bilateral agreement would focus solely on the accounting 
review required of internationally merging companies. This 
agreement, therefore, would be minimally intrusive into 
China’s regulatory authority. There is already economic and 
political support for the creation of international competition 
law, as such a law “would be welfare enhancing relative to a 
situation in which each nation enforces its competition laws on 
an extraterritorial basis in accordance with its national self-
interest.”223
Different countries’ competition laws tend to be similar in 
substance and procedure.
 WTO members are likely to reach an agreement on 
the macro issues of competition policy, leaving the micro issues 
to be resolved by individual countries. 
224 Within Asia, however, not all 
members of a regional trade association, namely the Asia 
Pacific Economic Co-operation (“APEC”), have competition 
laws,225 and those that do seem to function in a distinct 
manner.226
The issues of accounting and corporate disclosure 
standards are likely to be categorized as micro issues in the 
drafting of an international competition law.
 This regional issue represents an even larger issue. 
If all WTO members are expected to agree on an international 
competition law, which requires a consensus, the law will 
inevitably be general in nature. It will not necessarily address 
Chinese accounting and corporate disclosure issues, but it may 
indirectly require that the existing structure and agencies in 
China start complying with defined competition obligations. 
227
 
 223. See id. at 69. 
 Each country is 
likely to have very different ideas of what the micro issues are 
and countries will have divergent interests in micro issues 
based on their market conditions. It would be impractical, and 
inappropriate, for an international competition policy to 
 224. See id. at 75 (describing the rise of competition of laws as based on 
common notions such as fairness and well-accepted economic principles). 
 225. See id. (noting only some nations have adopted competition laws). 
 226. See TAYLOR, supra note 99, at 76 (arguing that competition laws are 
tailored to each country’s culture and thus remain “nationally distinctive”). 
 227. See id. at 79 (defining micro issues as those that regulate institutional 
influences and market definitions). 
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prescribe certain regulations within each country with the aim 
of unifying competition laws. 
WTO members have the option of creating a broad 
competition law that would outline specific macro issues. Most 
countries believe that competition law should have the primary 
objective of encouraging competition, in the hope of increasing 
economic efficiency.228 There is evidence that countries are 
likely to be able to come to a consensus on the key macro 
issues: merger laws, anti-monopoly laws, and concerted conduct 
laws.229
The United States, along with other countries, embraces 
the extraterritoriality of competition law.
 Afterwards, a bilateral agreement between the United 
States and China should be developed, building on China’s new 
competition laws and WTO-created international competition 
laws, which enforces U.S. accounting requirements and 
Chinese merger review. Such an agreement would cover the 
micro issues discussed supra. 
230 Specifically the 
United States recognizes the “effects doctrine” in competition 
law which allows U.S. antitrust laws to extend beyond U.S. 
jurisdiction if the transaction has a “material effect” on U.S. 
commerce.231
Any bilateral agreement between the United States and 
China regarding competition law must have proper 
enforcement mechanisms. The agreement should demonstrate 
a preference for case initiation by domestic agencies. For an 
agency to be an enforcer it must have access to detailed 
information about the companies.
 This doctrine, and its counterpart laws of other 
countries, may indicate a growing trend towards recognizing 
the international effects of transactions occurring beyond a 
country’s control and the growing need for an international 
competition law. As discussed above, though, it is necessary to 
make sure that such jurisdiction is enforceable, and this would 
only be possible with a bilateral agreement. 
232 U.S. enforcement agencies, 
such as the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of 
Justice,233
 
 228. See id. at 77. This goal was identified by the World Bank and OECD. 
 could be granted access to the internal records of 
 229. See id. at 78–79 (finding these principles to be a key structure in all 
APEC competition laws). 
 230. See id. at 64–65. The laws are relatively new and limited. 
 231. See Edward M. Graham, Approaches to Competition Theory, in TRADE 
RULES IN THE MAKING 438 (Miguel Rodriquez Mendoza, Patrick Low & 
Barbara Kotschwar eds., 1999). 
 232. These enforcement duties grant such agencies broad discovery powers. 
See id. at 436. 
 233. See U.S. Dep't of Justice & FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines 1 
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firms and could apply penalties to firms who do not keep proper 
records. Currently in horizontal mergers, the Federal Trade 
Commission or Department of Justice reviews the market 
share of the merging companies to ensure they do not create an 
overly concentrated market.234
 China has similar agencies in place with similar powers.
 While the only challenged 
mergers are those that pose a threat of concentration, it is the 
initial review of market share that requires preparation of 
records and reports relevant to reverse merger review. 
235
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
A bilateral agreement could require that these Chinese 
agencies perform a thorough review of all companies engaging 
in a merger, which is currently required by law within China, 
as well as a review of all CRMs. Upon review of a CRM, the 
Chinese agency could send a report to the SEC on its overall 
impression of the firm given its financial and operational 
information. The SEC could then align the certification with 
the Form 8-K that CRMs must file after completing the 
transaction. A firm that failed to disclose its intention to merge 
to the relevant Chinese authority would not have a certification 
on file with the SEC, prompting the SEC to inform the Chinese 
agency which could then either require compliance or apply a 
penalty against the firm. In the meantime, the SEC and the 
exchanges could prevent the CRM from being listed. 
Within the United States, CRMs pose an unreasonable risk 
to investors who rely on information disclosed to regulators 
when deciding where to put their money. Chinese companies 
have exploited lax auditors and minimal regulatory oversight 
to gain access to U.S. markets using fraudulent financial data. 
The SEC has attempted measures at increasing disclosure 
requirements to combat this risk, but has failed to address the 
underlying problem of a lack of compliance with auditing, 
accounting, and disclosure requirements of companies within 
China. In China, CRMs represent a form of investment that is 
discouraged in favor of FDI, meaning there is no vested 
government interest in ensuring CRMs remain a convenient 
form of investment. 
The optimal solution is not an outright ban on the reverse 
 
(2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf. 
 234. See id. at 4–5 (describing the process in which market share is 
calculated to determine if a merger is appropriate). 
 235. See CHONG, supra note 105, at 99 (describing China’s new merger 
control regime, but which only applies to foreign mergers). 
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merger transaction, as it does provide legitimate benefits to 
certain companies, but rather the formation of a plurilateral 
international competition law within the WTO. To more 
specifically address the CRM problem, this agreement should 
be immediately followed by a bilateral agreement between the 
United States and China. The international competition law 
could provide an international framework for the review of 
international merger transactions, while the bilateral 
agreement could address the specific procedures for ensuring 
Chinese companies are audited properly within China prior to 
entering U.S. markets. 
 
